Regional Centres for NSG commandos
Operation Black Tornado spearheaded by the NSG commandos to counter the Mumbai terror attack was highly successful and they deserve to be commended for the professionalism they had exhibited in carrying out this operation. The nation salutes not only the commandos drawn from the NSG, RAF, Army, Navy and Police but the entire security set up and fire service for the way they handled the terror attack.

But, it took close to 10 hours for the National Security Guards to reach the sites of terrorist attack after the first terrorist strike at 9.15 pm on November 26. Within an hour of its first strike the terrorists had struck at 12 spots in 10 locations and it was clear that it was a major terror strike. Taking the logistics into account, the NSG commandos should have been moved to the location within five or six hours. Why did it take 10 hours?
The decision makers in the home ministries both at the centre and the state know that the state police is not equipped to handle a situation like this. Was there a delay in decision making? If so, what caused the delay? What caused the delay in mobilization of the NSG? These are questions that need to be answered and corrective measures taken if we want to be in a state of preparedness for the next attack whenever or wherever it comes.
First things first, we need crack commando forces in every state capital because terror attacks on India are spreading in geographical terms. This will help cut down the reaction time of moving the NSG commandos from Manesar where they are presently stationed. I had made a suggestion to this effect in my post “Mother of terror attacks unleashed in Mumbai on November 27.” I reproduce below the relevant portion of my post:
“The operation gained momentum after the arrival of the National Security Guards commandoes who have special training to deal with situations of this kind. However, the fact that they arrived 10 hours after the attack is a matter of concern and the NSG should seriously consider stationing contingents of their commandoes at least at five locations in North, South, East, West and Central India so that they may be mobilized faster in times of emergencies. The operation gained momentum after the arrival of the National Security Guards commandoes who have special training to deal with situations of this kind. However, the fact that they arrived 10 hours after the attack is a matter of concern and the NSG should seriously consider stationing contingents of their commandoes at least at five locations in North, South, East, West and Central India so that they may be mobilized faster in times of emergencies.”
The Ministry of Home Affairs has subsequently decided to create regional NSG centres in the south, east and western parts to reduce the response time. NSG centres are being planned at Kolkata, Hyderabad and Mumbai/Nagpur. Maharashtra chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh too is considering a state commando force on the lines of NSG which is very welcome. One only hopes that these plans materialize soon.
India has been a victim of terror attacks close to a quarter of a century. The country has seen terror attacks with unnerving frequency. Terror attacks are now as regular as any other crime in our country. It highlights the lack of political will both at the central as well as state levels that we have not raised a crack commando force in every state to deal with terrorism.
We also need to set up a central terror monitoring and management cell which would spring into action the moment there is a terror attack in the country irrespective of which part of the country is under attack. The cell should act as an interface between the central government and the state agencies handling the crisis. It should be able to guide the state agencies and rush help where necessary. Law and order may be a state subject but the centre needs to oversee operations relating to terror attacks because it is an attack on the nation. If we had such a cell in Delhi, it would not have taken such a long time to decide on moving the NSG commandos.
While the flying time from Delhi to Mumbai is two hours, it took the NSG commandos close to four hours to move from their station at Manesar to the sites of attack in Mumbai.
Apparently, 45 minutes were spent driving up to Palam airport in Delhi from their base in Manesar. Similarly, the drive from the Mumbai airport to the sites of attack had taken another 45 minutes. This is ridiculous.
It beats common sense that a force that has been raised to tackle terror attacks and hijacks which call for quick response have not been provided helicopters to move the commandos in such emergencies. That is a major lapse. The other thing is, if they did not have helicopters why didn’t somebody think of requisitioning an helicopter to ferry them from their base to Delhi airport and from Mumbai airport to the site of attack? That could have saved some time. Response time is of essence in such operations and delays can make a huge in the way the situation is handled.
It is my sincere hope that the authorities would see sense in what has been discussed here and take a cue from here to help the force reduce its response time.
In a terror situation like this two things are of paramount importance. One, there should be a split second decision on the mobilization of commandos. And, two, their movement should be quick and smooth.





