IS U.S. MONEY REALLY SUPPORTING AFGHAN INSURGENCY? by Bassam Javed

The U.S. engagement in Afghanistan has consumed billions of dollars in sustaining external logistics supply routes for its war effort in Afghanistan.

The challenges in securing the external transit routes nevertheless are potentially going to outweigh the costs that U.S. pays to secure internal transits routes within Afghanistan vis-à-vis its aim to stabilize that country. To ensure safe transiting of its supplies within Afghanistan the U.S. military is involved in massively funding the corrupt public officials, the Taliban and Afghan warlords controlling various transit lanes. In fact the tens of thousands of dollars being paid to these agencies have gone to provide a massive chunk in sustenance of Taliban insurgency. In order to support over two hundred forward operating bases and outposts however, the U.S. supply chains have been outsourced to local truckers and Afghan security providers who over the years have turned into individual armed forces to be reckoned with. This whole enigma is getting along undeterred in blatant violation of US laws on the use of private contractors as well as US Defense Department’s regulations and goes to completely undermine larger U.S. declared commitments to curtail corruption and strengthen effective governance in Afghanistan.

The existing arrangement is excessively being utilized as a conduit for funds to the Taliban cause and other anti government forces in the name of essentially required payoffs to enable safe trucking of convoys through their respective areas. The Taliban rely heavily on this particular source for their very existence in Afghanistan. The Afghan convoy security managers provide supplies, provide cash in U.S. dollars and sell weapons to Taliban when demanded in return for granting safe passage through areas under their control. U.S. Secretary of State while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 2009 acknowledged that “one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money”.

Despite the fact that the U.S. Defense Department always knew of the logistics convoys’ protectionists’ racket, it always laid blame on out side agencies for providing funds to Taliban insurgency. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries have been regularly blamed for the act. The US has always deflected the fact that it is the country that has helped sustain Taliban insurgency since its inception through its massive cash pay offs to Taliban to enable its forces receive essential logistics for their survival.

The other sources of funding the insurgency are the drug trade and protection money. Taliban have long profited off the ten percent Ushr tax levied on opium farmers, an additional tax on the traffickers and a per-kilogram transit tariff charged to the traffickers who transport the drugs. As per the ‘Wall Street Journal’ cell phone operators in Afghanistan “routinely disburse protection money to Taliban commanders”. These payments are in addition to money “openly passed to local tribal elders to protect a cell-tower site-cash that ends up in the coffers of Taliban. U.S. Defense Department has been well aware of the fact that their money paid to the contractors ultimately ends up with insurgents who would buy out arms and ammunition from the same money to fight against them however, preference was always given to ensure that their forces deployed on the front and outposts receive the required logistics in time. One manager associated with the trucking schedule has given his estimates of US $1.6 to US $2 million a week.

The deliberate non-involvement of NATO-ISAF soldiers in protecting the logistics convoys en route to the delivery points was one of the lessons learnt from the Soviets’ efforts of doing so wherein they committed their three-fourth of combat forces for the purpose. The strategy failed Soviets to sustain large occupational force to control key areas and cities. In U.S. Afghan strategy the responsibility for the supply chain in Afghanistan has been entrusted with local truckers and unknown security providers. The strategy enabled the U.S. to devote a greater structure of their forces to priority operations. However, in the process the Americans have themselves been funding parallel power structures that undercut efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

Going back to the history of American wars, the practice of relying on private defense companies has been wide spread. On of the magazines ‘Business Week’ had dubbed the Vietnam War as ‘war by contract’ then. In Afghanistan too the private contractors make up 60 percent of the US Defense Department’s work force in Afghanistan. A Senate Armed Services Committee investigation concluded this October that the wide spread use of contractors is putting the Afghan exit strategy at risk. Anthony Cordesman who works with Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington recently wrote,” If you want to know the driving force of corruption in Afghanistan, it’s not Afghan culture, its American contracting”.

This is the time for US to turn its attention to the illicit funding streams that ultimately lands with the Taliban through these security contractors. The practice has grave consequences for the desired peace and stability in Afghanistan especially when the Afghan mission is on its way to be wrapped up soon. The American mis-adventure thus would leave behind a legacy wherein these hired security contractors have nurtured into formidable small and individual armies impossible to control. These contractors when let off the security duties will have no job occupation but only to use their expertise in further destabilization of Afghanistan and would remain available for sale. Violent as they are, they would create mayhem after the exit of U.S./NATO forces not only for the Kabul government but also for the region. For its part Pakistan would like that the exiting forces leave behind a stabilized and peaceful Afghanistan which is so essential for its immediate national and security interests. For that to happen, the U.S. and NATO forces need to immediately look for alternate means to secure their logistics convoys and do away with this hardened corps of Afghan security guards, an act that would ultimately also stop supporting the insurgency.